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TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC SCIENCE:
PURPOSES, REASONS, LIMITS
SHEILA JASANOFF*
I
INTRODUCTION
Science and secrecy do not sit comfortably together. In technologically
advanced democracies, it is almost an article of faith that openness is essential
both for the advancement of science and for its beneficial interaction with
society. Internally, scientific communities consider the free exchange of ideas
through peer criticism and publication indispensable for progress.1 Externally,
too, the demands for openness have grown as science’s relations with society
have become more complex and pervasive.2 Scientific knowledge underwrites
an ever greater cross-section of the decisions that governments make about
their citizens’ health, safety, security, and welfare.3 Democratic control over
public decisions therefore demands some ability on the part of a polity to
evaluate the knowledge claims that justify actions taken on its behalf.
Otherwise, the door would be opened to arbitrary and irrational decisions in
the name of government.
With the passage of the federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946,4 the
U.S. government recognized the right of citizens to participate in agency
rulemaking and an associated right to receive information, including scientific
and technical information, in order to effectuate the goal of informed
participation. Later U.S. statutes have consistently expanded the public’s right
to know and to assess the information underlying governmental decisions, even
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1. For example, the International Council for Science maintains that scientists’ ability to
participate freely and without discrimination in legitimate scientific activities is an essential element of
the Principle of the Universality of Science. International Council for Science, Universality of Science
Principle, http://www.icsu.org/5_abouticsu/INTRO_UnivSci_1.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).
2. See, e.g., DAVID GUSTON, BETWEEN POLITICS AND SCIENCE: ASSURING THE INTEGRITY
AND PRODUCTIVITY OF RESEARCH (2000) (analyzing the changing relationship between science and
politics); DANIEL KEVLES, THE BALTIMORE CASE: A TRIAL OF POLITICS, SCIENCE, AND
CHARACTER (2000) (recounting the investigation into the efficacy of Nobel-Prize-winner David
Baltimore’s gene transfer research).
3. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS
(1990) [hereinafter JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH] (discussing the current scientific advisory process
and the influence of science on our daily lives).
4. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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when that information is highly technical.5 Some of these laws aim to increase
the transparency of governmental decisionmaking in general;6 others are
tailored to specific policy frameworks, such as health, safety, and environmental
regulation. Consequently, U.S. citizens, more perhaps than in any other
democratic nation, can count on having access to official information, including
the evidence and reasoning relied upon by the government’s extensive network
of expert advisers.7
To be sure, normative considerations work against total transparency in
government and may legitimately bar access to some stages or aspects of
scientific knowledge production. These norms flow, in the first instance, from
the nature of scientific research itself. Science, as a process, depends on a
certain amount of unrestricted trial and error, as well as on competitiveness
among peers.8 Excessive or premature demands for public disclosure may
therefore hamper creativity or produce disincentives for high-risk research.
Additional constraints on disclosure derive from considerations largely external
to science: for example, the need to protect the privacy of research subjects, the
confidentiality of proprietary business information, the discretionary spaces of
governmental decision-making, or national security interests. Openness and
transparency in science, then, cannot be treated as absolute goods. Rather, the
degree of openness is context-specific and needs to be traded off against other
important social values. The problem for contemporary law and policy is to
develop principled approaches to maintaining the desired balance.
That problem has grown in salience throughout the last half-century,
assuming today an urgency that is, arguably, greater than at any time since the
beginnings of the scientific revolution.9 The reasons have to do with wideranging changes in the practice of science, as well as in its dynamic relationship
5. Important legislative expansions of the public’s right to know and assess information used by
the government include the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–15 (2000), and the Data Quality Act, a rider to the Treasury and
General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2663 (2000).
6. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (requiring federal agencies to disclose certain
information when requested by citizens); Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–15
(authorizing “the establishment of a system of governing the creation and operation of advisory
committees in the executive branch of the Federal Government” and requiring that advisory committee
meetings be open to the public); Data Quality Act § 515 (requiring the Office of Management and
Budget to provide federal agencies with rules that will increase the quality and integrity of information
they produce).
7. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–15.
8. For sociological accounts of scientific practice, see BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION
(1987) and H.M. COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER (1985).
9. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
THIRD REPORT, 1999-2000, H.L. 38-1.1, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldselect/ldsctech/38/3801.htm [hereinafter SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY] (“[T]here has never been a time when the issues involving science were more
exciting, the public more interested, or the opportunities more apparent.”). The Commission White
Paper on Governance Working Group 1b, Democratising Expertise and Establishing European
Scientific References (May 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/areas/
group2/report_en.pdf [hereinafter Democratising Expertise and Establishing European Scientific
References], provides an example of the urgency that developing principled approaches to science has
assumed within the European community.
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with society. Robert Merton, America’s first great sociologist of science, noted
the early stirrings of discontent in his well-known 1942 essay on the norms of
science.10 At that time, science was under attack from totalitarian regimes in
war-torn Europe. Threatened by powerful political forces, science, in Merton’s
view, needed to defend its autonomy as it had not been required to do in 300
years of unmitigated success.11 At stake was science’s right to govern itself and
to maintain the culture of openness that antidemocratic governments of all
stripes wished to suppress.12 Defenders of science saw it as the foremost bastion
of free thought and inquiry, as a firm refuge against ideology, and even as a
perfect working model of democracy.13 Science, they believed, was internally so
transparent—so disciplined through processes of peer criticism—that it needed
no further supervision by outsiders.14 External interference would unduly
politicize science, detracting from scientists’ ability to produce disinterested,
universal truths when left alone.15
Today, the threats to openness in science stem not so much from pressure
by dictatorial regimes as from the increasing embeddedness of science in
society.16 Scientific knowledge is too important to be any longer characterized
as “disinterested,”17 as Merton termed it. The growth of national economies,
the comparative military advantages of states, the market shares of companies,
the health and safety of populations and the environment, and, increasingly, the
vitality of universities and the personal fortunes of scientists all depend on
producing useful scientific knowledge. Science can no longer afford to be
disinterested; it serves too many purposes and too many masters to claim or to
seek detachment.
Indeed, some scholars have argued that the sea change in scientific practices
in the past few decades has led to a new era of “Mode 2” science, replacing the

10. ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE:
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267 (Robert K. Merton ed., 1973). Merton argues
that the unique ethos of science is defined by four norms: (1) communalism, (2) universalism, (3)
disinterestedness, and (4) organized skepticism. Id. at 270–78.
11. Id. at 267–68.
12. Id.
13. For a classic elaboration of this argument, see Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science, 1
MINERVA 54, 54–74 (1962), available at http://www.mwsc.edu/orgs/polanyi/mp-repsc.htm.
14. See id. See also Roy Macleod, Science and Democracy: Historical Reflections on Present
Discontents, 35 MINERVA 369 (1997).
15. One classic statement of this position may be found in DON K. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE
(1965). Price observed that there are four estates involved in the work of government: the scientific,
the professional, the administrative, and the political. He maintains that “[t]he most important
principle seems to be a twofold one: (1) the closer the estate is to the end of the spectrum that is
concerned solely with truth, the more it is entitled to freedom and self-government; and (2) the closer it
gets to the exercise of power, the less it is permitted to organize itself as a corporate entity, and the
more it is required to submit to the test of political responsibility, in the sense of submitting to the
ultimate decision of the electorate.” Id. at 137.
16. See MICHAEL GIBBONS ET AL., THE NEW PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 4 (1994) (arguing
that, in the new “Mode 2” of production, “knowledge is intended to be useful to someone whether in
industry or government[] or society more generally and this imperative is present from the beginning”).
17. MERTON, supra note 10, at 275.
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disinterested, non-utilitarian “Mode 1” science of the academic ivory tower.18
Mode 2 science, these analysts argue, is characterized by mission-oriented
research, cross-disciplinary approaches, institutional diversification, and
growing public demands for accountability.19 As a result, it is no longer possible
to ask science to merely give us “good”—that is, true or reliable—knowledge.
Not content with merely good science, decisionmakers and publics are also
asking, and advisedly so, “What is science good for, and is it good enough to
serve those purposes?”20 Questions like these, moreover, require input from a
wider range of potential observers than the circle of peer reviewers traditionally
called upon to certify the goodness of scientific claims.
Yet modern societies’ increasing dependence on science has proceeded
hand in hand with developments that disable most citizens, even the most
technically expert, from effectively addressing the larger set of questions: Is it
good science; what is it good for; and is it good enough? Science has not only
become infused with multiple social and political interests; it is also in danger of
escaping effective critical control. Too often scientific knowledge seems to be
“sequestered,” concealed from those who could benefit from it or who could
comment meaningfully on its quality and relevance.21 Along with the other
contributions to this special issue, this article focuses on the breakdowns in
openness that are of special concern for law and policy and seeks to propose
appropriate remedies. But to solve the problem of sequestration, we need first
to be clearer about what it is and how it arises.
A logical starting point for that inquiry is to question the term itself. What
does sequestration of knowledge mean, both in general and, more particularly,
in and for science? What makes it undesirable, and is it always so? Is
sequestration especially problematic when the subject at issue is public science,
that is, science used to support decisions of significant public concern? In what
follows, the term public science includes policy-relevant knowledge in the
broadest sense: science that underwrites specific regulatory decisions, science
offered as legal evidence, science that clarifies the causes and impacts of
phenomena that are salient to society, and science that self-consciously
advances broad social goals, such as environmental sustainability. What
measures can the law adopt to ensure the proper disclosure of such science, and

18. See GIBBONS ET AL., supra note 16, at 1–16 (thoroughly discussing the intersection, similarities,
and differences between Mode 1 and Mode 2 science).
19. Id. at 1–3; see also HELGA NOWOTNY ET AL., RE-THINKING SCIENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND THE
PUBLIC IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (2001).
20. See Democratising Expertise and Establishing European Scientific References, supra note 9;
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 9.
21. See SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HOW THE LURE OF PROFITS
HAS CORRUPTED THE VIRTUE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 10–24, 82–85 (2003) (describing how ties
to pharmaceutical companies have led academic scientists to downplay the evidence of adverse side
effects and to respond unfavorably to fellow scientists’ requests for information); Eyal Press & Jennifer
Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39, 41–46 (discussing the secrecy
involved in corporate sponsored scientific research). See also discussion infra Part II.A (giving specific
examples of harmful concealment).
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are there circumstances when the law should erect barriers against disclosure
and debate?
These questions will be approached here from two angles, in the hope that
greater illumination will result from an intersection of perspectives. First, I will
consider the issue of sequestration directly, asking how it relates to secrecy in
general and how it comes about in the use and production of public science.
Second, I will look at the idea of transparency, often regarded as the opposite of
secrecy, paying special attention to how science and the law both promote
transparency, and why they sometimes guard against it. In the article’s
conclusion, I will take up the normative challenges of designing regimes of
scientific openness that promote informed debate on the aims, quality, and
adequacy of public science, while avoiding moves that might hinder the
production or use of reliable knowledge.
II
SECRECY AND SEQUESTRATION
The ordinary English term that comes closest to sequestration is secrecy. To
define the former more precisely, let us begin with the latter. In writing on
secrecy, the philosopher Sissela Bok takes “intentional concealment” as the
core of the concept.22 There are, she notes, many additional ideas, positive and
negative, that have become entwined with the idea of secrecy; among them are
“the concepts of sacredness, intimacy, privacy, silence, prohibition, furtiveness,
and deception.”23 Nevertheless, she argues, there is a virtue to beginning with
the most stripped-down and neutral definition because it allows the most room
to explore how secrecy plays out ethically in various domains.24
Bok’s proposal of beginning without fixed assumptions about the moral
valence of secrecy makes good sense for us—both methodologically and
normatively—in investigating secrecy at the intersections of science, policy, and
the law. To arrive at good judgments about the merits of particular forms of
concealment, it is necessary to begin from a position of agnosticism.
Methodologically, assuming that sequestration, like secrecy in its most basic
meaning, is simply about concealment allows for a symmetric consideration of
how science and law treat the act of concealing. What, specifically, are the
intentions that lead to intentional concealment, and how should those
intentions be ethically or morally evaluated? Neither institution views
disclosure as an unquestioned good, though both are firmly committed to
openness and transparency. In each, there is a definite, though shifting,
boundary between what should be shielded from external inspection and what
should be fully available for review. By asking what counts as good and bad
concealment in each institutional context, and on what grounds, we will lay the

22. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 9 (1982).
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id. at 9–10.

02__JASONOFF.DOC

26

10/4/2006 9:01 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:21

basis for asking how science and law can work together to maximize the
positive and minimize the negative valences of sequestering knowledge.
There are two respects, however, in which Bok’s definition of secrecy does
not go far enough for our purposes. In equating secrecy with intentional
concealment, she focuses more on the mindset of the individual agent who is
hiding something than on the characteristics of the environment in which
concealment is taking place or the person or persons from whom the thing is
being hidden.25 But sequestration, unlike secrecy, is not always intentional; it is
often a product of contextual features that affect the transmission of
knowledge. Further, the issue whether science is open enough, especially in the
domain of policy-relevant knowledge, cannot be fully decoupled from this
question: Open to whom? To be useful, scientific information has to be
available to those in a position to appraise and use it. Put differently,
information alone means little to society in the absence of an active interpretive
culture that is willing to criticize and able to make sense of it. It may be said
that sequestration of science is the concealment of scientific knowledge,
intentionally or unintentionally, from audiences who would be in a position to
make that knowledge better or more beneficial if it were open to them.
Identifying the right audiences is not an insignificant problem, and it is a
relatively new one for contemporary policy-relevant science. In the era of
Mode 1 science, universities and research centers not only produced knowledge
but also produced the peer communities needed to certify its quality.26 Because
scientists needed to rely on each other’s claims in order to make progress, it
suited everyone’s interests to put in place honest and capable processes of peer
criticism.27 Not coincidentally, the practice of peer review grew up side by side
with the research practices of modern science itself. Scientists needed a
trustworthy method of validating each other’s claims if their enterprise was to
move forward.28 It should not surprise us that seventeenth century solutions to
the problem of scientific openness do not fully live up to the needs of the
twenty-first century. Mode 2 science has entailed a shift from narrower issues
of quality control (is it good?) to broader questions of accountability (is it
relevant; is it good enough?).29 That shift, in turn, changes the terms of scientific
openness, forcing us to consider again the rationale for, the processes of, and
the limits to transparency. In particular, when science is generated to serve
public purposes it becomes important to ensure that information will reach the
right recipients and be appropriately scrutinized by them. Mere disclosure is

25. See id. at 3–15 (discussing secrecy and its definition from the perspective of the person with the
secret).
26. GIBBONS ET AL., supra note 16, at 8.
27. Id.
28. For an absorbing historical account of this development, see STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON
SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR-PUMP: HOBBES, BOYLE, AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE
(1985).
29. Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science, 41
MINERVA 223, 234–35 (2003).
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not enough. The question how to achieve transparency in public science
inevitably morphs into questions about transparency to whom.
An instructive example from the environmental arena is the Toxics Release
Inventory, a compilation of plant-specific chemical emissions demanded by
federal law and maintained by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).30 Enacted in the aftermath of the Bhopal gas disaster,31 the law aimed to
benefit communities near emitting facilities by informing them of potentially
toxic exposures.32 Ordinary citizens, however, could not interpret and use the
information without the aid of specialist organizations that, in effect, translated
the raw data into usable terms.33 Another example derives from the domain of
international security. Following the 2003 war on Iraq, top leaders in the
United States and Britain admitted that their knowledge of Saddam Hussein’s
ability to manufacture and deploy weapons of mass destruction was flawed.
Apparently, it was not active deception that produced these dangerous states of
ignorance. Rather, key actors were unable to assess the credibility and
robustness of intelligence information derived from multiple sources, each
operating with its own assumptions and standards of proof and evidence.34 In
building a principled foundation for the openness of public science, then,
attention must be paid not only to who is responsible for disclosure, and what
they must disclose, but also, importantly, to what kinds of critical reviewers
those disclosures should be made.
A. Two Perspectives on Disclosure
Let us begin by looking at two examples that epitomize, respectively, the
pros and cons of demanding the disclosure of policy-relevant scientific
30. The Toxics Release Inventory was established under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
11001–11050 (2000)), and expanded by the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–508, 104
Stat. 1388–321 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–13109 (2000)).
31. On December 3, 1984, toxic gas leaked from Union Carbide’s pesticide factory in Bhopal, India
resulting in weeks of death, panic, and disorganization known as the Bhopal Disaster. See LEARNING
FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994) [hereinafter
LEARNING FROM DISASTER], to learn more about the Bhopal Disaster and its consequences.
32. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, What is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program,
http://www.epa.gov/tri/whatis.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). Under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, businesses are required to report the names of chemicals in
their possession to their state and local government, and this information is then made available to the
public. 42 U.S.C. § 11022.
33. For more details, see Susan G. Hadden, Citizen Participation in Environmental Policy Making,
in LEARNING FROM DISASTER, supra note 31, at 91, 98–99.
34. In the United States, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, currently known as the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission, addressed these issues in its Report to the President on March 31, 2005. COMMISSION ON
THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf. In Britain, a comparable inquiry was made in the
Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr. David Kelly, also known as the
Hutton Inquiry.
LORD HUTTON, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF DR. DAVID KELLY, C.M.G. (2004), available at http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/report/index.htm.
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knowledge. A strong case for wider disclosure comes from the biomedical
domain. Between 1998 and 2002, Britain’s largest drug company, Glaxo
SmithKline (GSK), conducted five clinical trials evaluating the effects of an
anti-depressant, known in the United States as Paxil, on children and young
adults.35 According to a fraud suit filed in June 2004 by the New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, GSK failed to disclose that in at least four of
these studies the drug had performed no better than the placebo used as a
control.36 Worse, the drug appeared to increase suicidal thoughts in adolescents
at a measurably higher rate than the placebo.37 In August 2004, GSK settled the
lawsuit by agreeing to disclose the negative trial information in a registry on its
website and to pay New York State $2.5 million as compensation for its
previous nondisclosure.38
The GSK case dramatized the problem of drug companies’ not making
negative results from clinical trials public, thereby skewing, in a favorable
direction, the information available on their products. But GSK was not the
only firm implicated in this kind of concealment. In September 2004, a U.S.
drug company, Merck, announced a worldwide withdrawal of its blockbuster
anti-arthritis drug, Vioxx, on the discovery that the drug causes “statistically
significant” increases in heart attacks and strokes in patients taking the drug for
sustained periods.39 In November 2004, the Wall Street Journal reported that
the company’s e-mails showed the problem was known internally from the mid1990s onward; Merck’s own research director, Edward Scolnick, wrote in an email in 2000 that the cardiovascular effects “are clearly there,” although Merck
later characterized his comments as unchecked initial impressions of the data.40
A study by the Food and Drug Administration indicated that the drug could
have caused more than 27,000 heart attacks and deaths before it was
withdrawn.41 By mid-2005, Merck was facing thousands of legal claims
amounting to potentially as much as $50 billion in damages.42
In response to events like these, major policy actors enthusiastically took up
the issue of disclosure. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) proposed a
policy change that would require all scientists funded by the agency to make
35. David Teather & Sarah Boseley, Glaxo Faces Drug Fraud Lawsuit, THE GUARDIAN (London),
June 3, 2004, Home Pages, at 1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Press Release, Glaxo SmithKline, Glaxo SmithKline Settles Lawsuit with New York Attorney
General’s
Office
(Aug.
26,
2004),
http://www.gsk.com/ControllerServlet?appId=4&pageId=402&newsid=301.
39. Gina Kolata, Merck and Vioxx: The Overview; A Widely Used Arthritis Drug is Withdrawn,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at A1.
40. Merck Officials Explain Internal Documents Related to Safety Risks of Vioxx, CALIFORNIA
HEALTHLINE, Nov. 15, 2004, available at http://californiahealthline.org/index.cfm?Action=dspItem&
itemID=107443.
41. FDA Study Estimates More than 27,000 Heart Attacks Linked to Vioxx, CALIFORNIA
HEALTHLINE, Nov. 3, 2004, available at http://www.californiahealthline.org/index.cfm?Action=
dspItem&itemID=107194.
42. Aaron Smith, Merck’s Vioxx Bill Could Hit $50 Billion, CNN MONEY, Aug. 22, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/22/news/fortune500/merck/.
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their research results freely available to the public through its electronic
database, PubMed Central.43 Editors of a dozen leading medical journals
announced that they would refuse to publish drug-company clinical trial results
unless the results were registered in a public database from the start.44 This step
would help ensure that unfavorable studies did not simply disappear from view.
Knowledge of studies that failed to show benefits would help guard against
overoptimism in the evaluation of studies that did show positive results. A
House subcommittee decided to hold hearings on the issue, prompting Merck
to state that it would post its trial results on an NIH website.45
The second example, which puts demands for openness in a more
ambiguous light, comes from the environmental domain. It arose pursuant to
the Data Quality Act of 2000.46 The Act itself is a classic example of nontransparent legislation—a two-sentence provision written by Jim Tozzi, an
industry lobbyist, and inserted without any public debate into a massive and
opaque appropriations bill.47 On its face, the Act simply requires the Office of
Management and Budget to ensure that all information disseminated by federal
agencies meet standards of “quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity.”48 This
could be seen as a bow toward greater transparency in that it subjects agency
science to stricter external scrutiny. Skeptical outsiders may use the Act to
question agency data for possible bias. In practice, however, as illustrated
below, the Act authorizes challenges to publicly generated information on the
basis of claims that are not themselves subject to equivalent standards of
openness. While opening up some scientific practices, the Act in this respect
encourages others that are not covered by law and are far from transparent. It
is, from this standpoint, an invitation to asymmetry in the evaluation of public
scientific claims.
Our illustrative case stems from a challenge initiated by the European
chemical company Syngenta against a finding by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) that the company’s profitable herbicide, atrazine, is an
endocrine disruptor that causes hormonal changes in frogs and other animals.
Privately sponsored research, conducted without the transparency mandates of
public decisionmaking, was used in this case to challenge and destabilize EPA’s
expert judgment. To contest EPA’s finding, Syngenta first turned to a private
company, Eco-Risk, to sponsor additional studies on atrazine.49 A University of
43. Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting from NIH-Funded
Research, NOT-OD-05-022, NIH Guide for Grants and Contracts (Feb. 4, 2005), available at
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-05-022.html.
44. Shankar Vedantam, Journals Insist Drug Manufacturers Register All Trials, WASH. POST, Sept.
9, 2004, at A2.
45. Gardiner Harris, Merck Says It Will Post the Results of All Drug Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2004, at C4.
46. Data Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2663 (2000).
47. See Rick Weiss, Data Quality Law Is Nemesis of Regulation, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2004, at A1
(discussing, in part, the origin of the Data Quality Act).
48. Data Quality Act § 515 (a).
49. Weiss, supra note 47.
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California scientist hired by Eco-Risk confirmed that atrazine reduces
testosterone levels in male tadpoles and produces hermaphrodites, but the
terms of his agreement blocked him from publishing his result.50 Other studies
tending to show opposite results, however, continued to be funded by Eco-Risk,
and these became the basis for a petition against EPA by Jim Tozzi’s Center for
Regulatory Effectiveness.51 Tozzi also argued that EPA could not rely on the
studies demonstrating atrazine’s ill effects because the agency had not yet
developed a “gold standard” test for endocrine disruption.52 Heavily criticized
by EPA’s scientific advisers, the studies put forward by Eco-Risk nevertheless
managed, in the words of one observer, to “manufacture uncertainty.”53 In the
end, EPA opted for continued monitoring of atrazine rather than restricting its
use more stringently.54
The two cases put the issue of secrecy on a complex footing, substituting
shades of gray for stark black-and-white judgments. They point to three
problems that require closer investigation:
(1)
the problem of imperfect accountability, reflected in the fact that
mere production of new scientific studies, without disclosure to
competent critics, neither guarantees increased validity or authenticity
of results nor ensures their appropriate interpretation (illustrated by
both cases);
(2)
the problem of asymmetric standards, evinced by the fact that codes
of scientific openness are not uniformly observed or enforced in
practice, thereby creating asymmetries in the standards applied to
privately and publicly sponsored research (illustrated by both cases);
(3)
the problem of excessive transparency, displayed in the fact that
expanded disclosure requirements and more formal accountability
procedures do not necessarily lead to “better” science, either in the
sense of more reliable knowledge or in the sense of science better
suited to serving its intended purposes (illustrated by the atrazine
case).
Before returning to the policy implications of these three points, the reasons for
the uneasy balance struck between disclosure and concealment in scientific and
legal practice should be probed more deeply. Why, and through what
mechanisms, does each institution sometimes violate so foundational a principle
as openness?
B. Legitimate Concealment?
Openness, it may be noted, is a concern only when someone who is outside
a domain wishes to be or to look inside it. From this perspective, it is not
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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surprising that the vast bulk of scientific activity is never subjected to demands
for more transparency. In the everyday world of the laboratory or the field,
most researchers go about their business without feeling constrained by closed
doors or locked drawers; they are in free communication with co-participants in
the production of new knowledge. Nor, in the absence of specific reporting
requirements,55 are they required to account to outsiders for their routine
activities. The situation changes dramatically when the products of the lab
bench, namely scientific claims and representations, are used to justify actions
taken outside the spaces of research—for example in supporting a patent
application, or in supporting or questioning a regulatory decision, or in charging
a manufacturer or discharger with negligence. It is in these situations—when
science moves from contexts of production to contexts of public use and
application—that pressures for disclosure most often arise.56 Communication
among and certification by peers and co-workers are no longer sufficient to
guarantee the quality and relevance of the science in question. Critics situated
outside the original research environment also ask to be allowed to look in at
the way the claimed research was done.
When are these demands entitled to respect, and how should the law
respond? Should any interested outsider have the right, on demand, to gain
access to any aspect of public, or policy-relevant, science that the challenger
thinks ought to be questioned? To clarify these issues further, it is necessary to
characterize the most common sources of sequestration in public science. Each
kind of concealment is problematic when not kept within reasonable bounds,
but each is justifiable under some conditions. In each case, too, the problem
revolves as much around the appropriate audience for the disclosure (to whom
should science be open?) as it does around what should be disclosed and by
whom. Once again, the problem for law and policy is how to strike the right
balance between the competing demands of concealment and disclosure.
There is, to begin with, the kind of secrecy that everyone deplores but that is
fostered by institutional cultures of self-interest, both public and private—when
scientific facts that the public has a right to know are intentionally hidden and
knowingly withheld to preserve the economic or political standing of powerful
organizations. Examples include drug companies that fail to disclose reports of
adverse reactions to their products,57 car manufacturers that hide technical
defects in their vehicles,58 employers and polluters who conceal data about
55. Researchers working with animal and human subjects, for example, must maintain records that
satisfy legal obligations for animal welfare and informed consent. Testing laboratories must satisfy
legally mandated standards for good laboratory practices and maintain the records needed to make
their operations transparent to inspectors.
56. See generally JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH, supra note 3 (providing an analysis of the
interaction between advisory committees and the scientific process).
57. See discussion supra Part II.A.
58. In August 2000, for example, Bridgestone-Firestone announced the recall of tires because of
tread separations that were alleged to have caused dozens of fatal accidents. Although Ford Motor
Company had recalled similar tires on vehicles sold outside the United States, those recalls were not
reported to the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Tamara Audi & Jennifer Dixon,
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illness caused by their activities,59 and governmental agencies that paper over
malfunctions in technologies that are deemed key to the success of their
missions.60 Impediments to criticism and communication have also arisen within
universities, the traditional strongholds of scientific openness, as a result of
private sponsorship that contractually demands secrecy.61 Yet, problematically
for law and policy, unlawful or indefensible concealment is bound up even in
these relatively clear-cut cases with defensible grounds for not making things
known. Corporate-funded science, for example, may enjoy commercial
confidentiality, and publicly funded science in sectors such as computers or
biotechnology may be shielded by legitimate, if overused, demands for secrecy
in the name of national security.62 Even the legal process, which prizes
openness as a core value, sanctions some types of concealment because it is
deemed to serve the higher purpose of delivering justice.63
Second, institutional features of large organizations may impede the flow of
scientific and technical information in ways that serve key organizational
interests, but that produce the effect of concealment without malign intent.
Such blindness occurs, in particular, when organizations “normalize deviance,”
that is, rationalize seemingly harmless deviations from rules so that they
become taken for granted and part of the routine. Recording every minor
misstep could bring any organization to a grinding halt, and some level of trust
in colleagues is essential to an organization’s effective functioning. At what
point the mere suspicion of things being wrong rises to the level of reportable
misconduct is always a discretionary question, as Merck argued in connection
with its internal e-mails on Vioxx.64 On the other hand, failure to report
repeated, systemic problems creates the preconditions for more serious
breakdowns. It may take a disaster to sound a wake-up call. Signals of failure
at low temperatures in the o-rings of the Challenger space shuttle’s booster
rocket went officially unnoticed until the shuttle blew up in 1986;65 years later,
the loss of the Columbia space shuttle in January 2003 revealed similar
Documents Show Ford Was Warned About Tire Tread; Automaker Says It Acted Quickly Once It
Received Hard Data, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 6, 2000, at 1A.
59. See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
(1985) (relating how companies such as Johns-Manville and W.R. Grace & Company systematically
concealed medical information about the nature and extent of asbestos-induced diseases among their
workers).
60. See DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY,
CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 238–77 (1996) for a discussion of the defects in reporting and
communication that led to the loss of the space shuttle Challenger.
61. KRIMSKY, supra note 21, at 27–52 (describing how corporate and industrial funding at major
universities, including Harvard and the University of California at Berkeley, has led to unethical
research, inappropriate conflicts of interest, and biased hiring and firing decisions).
62. See, e.g., Ryan Ricks, Science and Security in the Post-9/11 Environment, AAAS Science and
Policy Programs (July 2004), http://www.aaas.org/spp/post911/publishing/ (discussing how concerns of
national security have been used to restrict the availability of scientific data since the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001).
63. See discussion on this point infra Part IV.
64. See discussion supra Part II.A.
65. VAUGHAN, supra note 60, at xi–xiii, 238–77.
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organizational blinkers.66 Similarly, the 9/11 Commission’s report called
attention to the failure of public authorities to predict adequately on the basis
of available knowledge.67 Within science, misconduct cases have reached
egregious proportions before colleagues of the deviant scientists were prepared
to acknowledge that something was wrong.68
Third, claims of inappropriate concealment may arise when technical
information moves across institutions that have different, perhaps incompatible,
standards of disclosure and transparency—as, for example, from the lab bench
to a regulatory agency or court of law. Relations of trust that are present within
and between institutions familiar with each other’s mission and operations often
break down when information crosses cultural lines. Police departments, for
instance, may trust their testing laboratory’s investigative protocols when
seeking information about a suspect’s DNA. Those same protocols may be
questioned more critically by defense attorneys when the test results could
affect their client’s life or liberty or could determine a child’s parentage and
immigration status. Thus, in the O.J. Simpson trial,69 defense lawyers in effect
asked permission to replicate the tests done by Cellmark, the lab used by the
prosecution.70 The defense demanded a share of the crime scene blood samples
in order to conduct its own tests.71 The request was not granted, but the episode
illustrates how divergent standards of credibility may be invoked when science
travels into legal contexts.72 Similarly, industries affected by EPA’s standard for
fine particulate matter wanted access to the supporting epidemiological data
produced by the Harvard School of Public Health;73 for opponents of the rule,
the acceptance of those data by the researchers’ scientific peers and their
publication in professional journals were not sufficient warrants of credibility.
That controversy led to the enactment of the so-called Shelby amendment,
which provides broad public access to federally funded research used to support
regulatory decisions.74
Fourth and finally, disclosure alone may amount to little more than
concealment unless it is made to audiences who can perform the desired critical
66. COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD, FINAL REPORT ON COLUMBIA SPACE
SHUTTLE ACCIDENT 122–92 (vol. 1 2003), available at http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasaglobal/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_full.pdf.
67. 9/11 COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE U.S. 254–77 (2004) (referring to frequent, but neglected, threats of terror attacks throughout
2001).
68. See WILLIAM BROAD & NICHOLAS WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 161–80 (1982)
(discussing the “club” atmosphere of scientific communities).
69. In the mid-1990s, former athlete O.J. Simpson was accused of and tried for the murder of his
wife and her friend. For more details of this legal controversy, see Sheila Jasanoff, The Eye of
Everyman: Witnessing DNA in the Simpson Trial, 28 SOC. STUD. SCI. 713 (1998).
70. Id. at 724–25.
71. Id. at 725.
72. Id. at 726.
73. The study is published in Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and
Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (1993).
74. The Shelby Amendment was passed as a rider to the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (1998).
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functions. Thus, review by experts may not, in and of itself, effectuate the
purposes of disclosure. They must also be the right experts. Being a scientist
does not necessarily confer a privileged position with respect to ensuring
adequate quality control—even if experts in the aggregate are better informed
than laypeople about major scientific theories or better able to judge the
plausibility of complex mathematical estimates. In cases involving public
science, experts may be too self-interested or too narrow in their disciplinary
outlook to ensure unbiased review. For instance, a scientist with expertise in
tropical forest ecosystems may be poorly placed to evaluate intricate arguments
about ocean-atmosphere feedback loops influencing climate change, and a
behavioral geneticist may be far less capable of assessing the health effects of
silicone gel breast implants than the scientifically untrained woman who
actually wears them in her body.
To detect problems in scientific arguments, it takes sufficient familiarity to
appreciate the subject matter under discussion and, at the same time, sufficient
detachment and distance to want to query the objectives and methods
underlying particular claims.75 That detachment is especially hard to achieve in
the context of highly consequential public science, in which the intellectual and
social biases of experts are most likely to come into play.76 Difficulties in
securing responsible criticism are compounded when, as is often the case for
public science, claims and data cut across disciplines, involve significant
uncertainties or entail significant methodological innovations.77 Achieving an
acceptable balance between blind trust and unfounded skepticism in review
processes for this kind of science has proved to be problematic for
governments.78
All these considerations point to a need to reevaluate the practices by which
scientific knowledge comes to be either sequestered or else made openly
available in decisionmaking environments. Everyone has an interest in
preventing cases of outrageous misconduct, in which the knowing concealment
of critically important data leads to injury or death. But given the central role
of science in public life, correcting these most flagrant abuses cannot be the
only goal. It is important to ensure that good scientific information not only is
available in the abstract, but also is made available to the right people, at the
right times, and in ways that promote accountability in the production,
transmission, and use of knowledge. Ideals of openness need to be extended, in
75. Sociologist of science Donald MacKenzie argues that there is a “credibility trough” that
operates in relation to scientific claims: in general, those closest to the production of knowledge (the
primary research community) and those most distant from it (laypeople, for instance) tend to be most
skeptical of claims; other users and consumers of knowledge are more trusting, or credulous. In the
context of public science, regulatory agencies and their expert reviewers arguably fall within that
intermediate zone of lowered skepticism. DONALD MACKENZIE, INVENTING ACCURACY: A
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF NUCLEAR MISSILE GUIDANCE 370–72 (1990).
76. For a hard-hitting investigation of the failure to achieve balance in science during the George
W. Bush administration, see CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005).
77. See generally JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH, supra note 3.
78. On the recurrent problems of scientific advice to government, see id.
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short, not only to the factual outputs of scientific research, but also—
judiciously—to science as a dynamic, social process of knowledge-making, with
normative components that call for public debate. And complicating all moves
toward greater transparency is the need to balance openness against
institutionally well-justified needs for concealment, or black-boxing, in both
science and law.
III
BLACK-BOXING KNOWLEDGE: SEQUESTRATION WITHIN SCIENCE
Observers of science from Merton and Polanyi onward have claimed
openness as one of the core values of scientific research. Science would not be
science without the structured peer criticism that Merton referred to as
“organized skepticism.”79 The belief that science transcends political and
cultural borders and is, or ought to be, equally open to all animates the work of
scientific societies such as the International Council for Science.80 Recent work
decrying the negative influence of corporate funding on scientific exchange also
assumes that openness is the expected and desired state of affairs in science.81
Federal laws and policies mandating disclosure, insisting on peer review,
protecting whistle-blowers, and penalizing fraud in science give legal effect to
these deep-seated convictions.
These bows toward transparency in public science need to be juxtaposed,
however, with the contrasting metaphor of the “black box” that has grown from
work in the past three decades in the social studies of science and technology.82
The concept of black-boxing describes the consolidation of scientific theories
and claims, as well as of technological systems,83 into entities that resist being
pulled apart, or seen through, once they become stable or established. The
“facts” of science and the products of technological systems become resistant in
this way when they are backed by sufficiently strong coalitions of actors,
institutions, norms, practices, and artifacts.84 Once this condition is attained, the
means by which facts were produced or artifacts took on particular shapes,
however contested these means may once have been, are eventually boxed up
79. MERTON, supra note 10, at 277.
80. This commitment is reflected in the International Council for Science’s adherence to the
Principle of the Universality of Science, which stresses the need for free flow of scientists and scientific
information across political borders. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
81. See DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE, MONEY, AND POLITICS: POLITICAL TRIUMPH AND
ETHICAL EROSION (2001) (discussing the politics of and financing of science in the last half century);
KRIMSKY, supra note 21, at 177–95 (criticizing the decline of public-interest science done in
universities).
82. See, e.g., LATOUR, supra note 8, at 2–3, 81–82; THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY
21–22 (Wiebe Bijker et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION].
83. See SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 82 (discussing the concept of the black box in
technological systems).
84. See LATOUR, supra note 8, at 179–257; Michel Callon, Some Elements of Sociology of
Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION, AND
BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 196 (John Law ed., 1986).
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and made invisible in everyday social interaction.85 The process of producing
science becomes less transparent with the passage of time.
Black-boxing of this kind, sociologists have argued, is essential to the
progress of science and, to some extent, also of technology.86 It is the feature
that permits later generations of scientists to accept and build on the work of
earlier ones without needing to go back and redo every step that others may
have traversed.87 Indeed, it would be perverse to insist on reexamining the
foundations of securely established knowledge once they have been firmly laid
down through long testing and repeated practical reconfirmation.88 At some
point, most scientists would argue, valid claims reach a state of repose that
should preclude further questioning of the ways in which they were produced.
This sense of legitimate closure applies not only to basic or bench science, but
also to much-studied phenomena in the realm of regulatory or policy-relevant
science: for example, that tobacco smoke causes cancer or that we are
experiencing a period of anthropogenic, or human-caused, climate change.
When claims have arrived at a certain degree of robustness, then asking for
renewed scrutiny of the ways in which those conclusions were reached strikes
many observers not as justifiable curiosity but as “manufacturing uncertainty”
for political ends.89 When public health and safety are at stake, such needless
production of uncertainty could be not erely frivolous but downright dangerous.
As has been extensively documented, the black boxes of science refuse to stay
closed under the pressure of adversarial processes—and claims begin to unravel no
matter how secure relevant scientific or policy communities believe the blackboxing to have been. 90 From a policy standpoint, such deconstruction is often
warranted because it reveals previously unacknowledged methodological bias or
weakness and can lead to eventual improvements. Evidence from DNA tests, for
example, was at first deemed foolproof and hence was uncritically accepted in
dozens of U.S. criminal trials until, beginning with the New York case of People v.
Castro91 and the Minnesota case of Schwartz v. State,92 knowledgeable experts
85. LATOUR, supra note 8, at 218.
86. On the black-boxing of technology, see SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 82.
87. See LATOUR, supra note 8, at 80–83 (describing how robust scientific claims get tied to too
many black boxes for a would-be dissenter to be able to untie them all).
88. Both scientists and lawyers speak about replication as the ultimate test of validity of a claimed
scientific fact. In practice, however, studies and experiments are seldom replicated. Even if they were
replicated, the conditions of replication would never be identical, and skeptics could keep questioning
the results through a process termed “experimenters’ regress.” See COLLINS, supra note 8, at 2, 84
(defining the principle of experimenter’s regress).
89. David Michaels, an epidemiologist at George Washington University, uses the term
“manufactured uncertainty” to refer to the practice of corporations challenging scientific findings in
order to delay government action based on those findings. Jeff Nesmith, New Product for U.S.
Industry: “Manufactured Doubt,” AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN, June 26, 2005, http://www.statesman.com/
search/content/insight/stories/06/26doubt.html.
90. For historical accounts, see SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995) [hereinafter JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR] and TAL GOLAN,
LAW’S OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (2004).
91. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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began questioning the methods used by DNA-typing companies, leading courts to
reject the evidence. Subsequent wide-ranging efforts to standardize testing
practices greatly improved the consistency and reliability of DNA identification.93
Similarly, the protocols for government-funded clinical trials of AIDS drugs
changed significantly when patient groups began questioning the need for
restrictive methodological assumptions,94 and pressure from women and minorities
led the NIH to formally require that researchers include understudied groups as
subjects in epidemiological research.95 Partly with such examples in mind, a
committee of the U.S. National Research Council recommended in 1996 that
official risk assessments should be open to a recursive analytic–deliberative process
in order to expose all phases of expert decisionmaking to wider public supervision.96
Yet there are strong arguments favoring the erection of some bulwarks against
the full-blown deconstruction of public science. Even within research science,
peer review and publication mark a sort of closure, a limit to transparency.
Scientists generally feel they can put their skepticism on hold when relying on
published results to develop further work, although the process of publication is
never wholly open—identities of reviewers are frequently protected in order to
encourage honest appraisals, and publication itself entails considerable editorial
discretion.97 From a policy standpoint, the reasons for closure are still more
compelling. Decisions cannot be postponed indefinitely while relevant facts are
questioned and re-questioned. Prudence demands that scientific debates should
not be allowed to proceed unchecked when there are potentially grave
consequences for public health and safety. Indeed, the growing recognition of the
precautionary principle in international environmental and health law reflects the
world community’s acceptance of precisely this normative judgment.98 Effective
policy systems therefore have to include stopping rules99 that close debate when it
no longer serves the public interest. Applied to science, these rules would block
skeptical inquiry beyond some point that society holds to be reasonable. The law
decrees when enough is enough, and at that point transparency ends.
A related set of concerns originates in the sociology of science, where scholars
have wondered how to ensure that criticism of public science is founded on

92. 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
93. On the standardization of DNA tests, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996) and Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA
Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 NATURE 735, 735–38 (1994).
94. STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE
208–64 (1996).
95. UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 118–32 (Paul C.
Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING RISK].
96. Id. at 3–4.
97. See JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH, supra note 3, at 61–83 (analyzing peer review and its
relationship to the scientific process).
98. See generally PRECAUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND PREVENTIVE PUBLIC POLICY
(Joel A. Tickner ed., 2003).
99. See discussion infra Part IV.
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defensible epistemological grounds.100 Put simply, not everyone is equally well
positioned to formulate meaningful questions about science in a given policy
context. Can we then ask whose inputs are essential to improving the quality and
reliability of policy-relevant science, and then tailor our transparency mechanisms
to ensure that these, and only these, critics come within the charmed circle of
openness? In other words, can the question “Open to whom?” be resolved by
issuing entry tickets to designated kinds of persons and excluding all others?
In one exploration of how to identify the appropriate critics, Harry Collins and
Rob Evans argued that legitimate participants in a scientific debate ought to
satisfy one or more of three criteria of relevant expertise: (1) they should be able
to contribute directly to the subject matter under debate (as in disciplinary peer
review), (2) they should be in a position to interact conceptually with those at the
core of the debate (as in the case of expert witnesses questioning DNA tests in
Castro and Schwartz), or (3) they should have experiential knowledge relevant to
the issues being debated (as in the case of AIDS patients involved in a clinical trial
or the wearer of breast implants in a legal proceeding about the implants’ effects
on health).101 They should, in other words, possess contributory expertise,
interactional expertise, or experiential expertise. Presumably, persons who do not
meet any of these tests should be excluded from attempts to join a controversy
that leads to the opening up of otherwise black-boxed scientific claims.
It is unlikely, however, that these threshold tests of expertise could have
prevented the sorts of prolonged controversies that have arisen in connection with
the effects of tobacco or, on a global scale, the causes of climate change. In these
cases, which were widely judged to be unproductive for public policy, dissident
scientists102 frequently met the first two of Collins’s and Evans’s tests of epistemic
competence: they belonged to the set of clearly knowledgeable, contributory
experts or they were in a position to interact productively with that core set. It is
not, then, the technical qualifications of experts that alone ensure unbiased or
thorough scrutiny. Rather, the manufacture of uncertainty in these cases raised
the kinds of procedurally grounded concerns encountered as well in the Vioxx and
atrazine cases—specifically, the challengers were funded by special interests and
represented only one perspective on the issues in question (imperfect
accountability), or the basis for the challengers’ claims was not as rigorously tested
as the claims they were contesting (asymmetric standards), or, given the gravity of
the possible harm, adequate stopping rules were not in place (excessive
transparency).

100. See H.M. Collins & Robert Evans, The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and
Experience, 32 SOC. STUD. SCI. 235, 235–39 (2004) (suggesting that expertise should be the measure of
a critic’s credibility).
101. Id. at 254–56.
102. One dissident scientist is MIT professor and atmospheric physicist Richard S. Lindzen who is
known for vocal opposition to generally accepted beliefs about global warming. Richard S. Lindzen,
Global Warming: The Origin and Nature of the Alleged Scientific Consensus, REGULATION, Spring
1992, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg15n2g.html.

02__JASONOFF.DOC

Summer 2006]

10/4/2006 9:01 AM

TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC SCIENCE

39

Epistemic closeness to a technical dispute undoubtedly helps critics open up
crucial questions of theory and method, but it does not guarantee that secondorder questions about the adequacy of knowledge or its fit to important social
purposes will be raised, or raised in appropriate forms. Experts close to the
technical heart of a debate are best at deciding whether science is good or not
good, according to accepted professional standards of evaluation; they may be less
well qualified to address what the science is good for or whether it is good enough.
Moreover, when scientific knowledge crosses disciplinary lines or breaks new
methodological ground, it may take a period of open-ended debate even to
determine who has the expertise to advance the processes of knowledge-making
and criticism.103 In short, although Collins’s and Evans’s criteria might serve as
necessary conditions for determining who must be included in the universe of
possible critics, they are not sufficient to ensure lack of bias or full accountability
in public science. Science’s own ideas of quality must in these instances be
supplemented by legal ideas of representation, fairness, relevance, and
sufficiency.104
IV
SEQUESTRATION UNDER LAW
Problems of sequestration take different forms when science is generated and
deployed within the legal process—which has become an increasingly important
site of knowledge-making in modern societies.
The law’s background
commitment, like that of science, is of course to total openness. Particularly in the
United States, the law’s no-holds-barred methods of discovery and of querying
evidence105 seem to effectuate that ideal. Procedures such as depositions and
cross-examinations can reveal biases and shortcomings that do not surface through
standard processes of scientific peer review and publication. Indeed, because
litigation itself is such a powerful prod to producing new scientific evidence,
adversarial legal processes sometimes provide the only significant testing ground
for claims relevant to settling disputes.106 Yet, what the law helps to generate it
also sometimes chooses not to make public, and the reasons underlying these
practices have largely been taken for granted by legal analysts and practitioners.
Two of these reasons are worth examining more closely in order to determine
when sequestration within the legal system may be considered legitimate.

103. UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 95, at 84–85.
104. See infra Part V.
105. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim
or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Similarly, all relevant evidence—evidence tending to make more or less
probable any fact of consequence to the case—is admissible unless otherwise prohibited. FED. R.
EVID. 401–402.
106. JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR, supra note 90, at 20.
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First, the law’s institutional interest in finality and repose is sometimes
advanced to bar disclosures of scientific information. A telling example is the
sealing of court records following an out-of-court settlement in private litigation.
Justified as an inducement to parties to resolve their disputes without the expense
of a trial, the practice nonetheless prevents potentially valuable scientific studies
from entering the public domain. In cases involving repeated technological
failure, as, for example, the case of Bic lighters igniting in users’ shirt pockets,107
sealing records may contribute to deaths and injuries that might have been
prevented through timely disclosure. Similarly, the settlement of environmental
damage claims may prevent the entry into the public domain of new knowledge
about ecological or health risks. Advances in economics and other social sciences
occurring in antitrust or discrimination cases may likewise escape disclosure
through settlements.
The bias against reopening cases not only bars the introduction of new
evidence but may stand in the way of socially beneficial research. Even in criminal
cases, courts have not always opened their doors to the possibility of new scientific
findings (such as DNA tests) that might, if ordered and credited, have overthrown
prior convictions and judgments.108 Uncertainty about judicial receptivity is an
obvious disincentive to potentially costly scientific investigations. In civil cases,
early settlement may deter follow-up studies of affected populations, thereby
rendering invisible the longer term health and environmental effects that might
have come to light through continued research.109 In other words, the law’s desire
for finality not only impedes the disclosure of available science, but also militates
against the open communication and exchange that lead to the production of new
scientific knowledge. Science generated to serve the purposes of litigation
remains case-bound and context-specific, often through specific acts of judicial
sequestration. Hence, knowledge produced in the litigation context is less likely to
circulate or to fertilize new research trajectories than knowledge produced in less
constricted research environments.
Decisions to entrust judges with active gatekeeping functions in relation to
scientific evidence create a somewhat different barrier to critical investigation
of scientific claims under U.S. federal law. The Supreme Court’s 1993 ruling in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.110 and two subsequent evidence
decisions111 may be seen, in the context of our discussion, as moves to prevent the
107. Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988).
108. See, e.g., Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying a prisoner’s claim for
postconviction DNA testing on the ground that legal finality cannot be sacrificed to changes in
technology).
109. Health effects, in particular, may take longer to manifest themselves than the time to
settlement, especially if they affect succeeding generations, as in the case of “DES daughters” born to
pregnant women treated with diethylstilbestrol (DES), or induce long-latency diseases like cancer or
neurological damage, as in the cases of Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange or Bhopal victims
exposed to gaseous methyl isocyanate.
110. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
111. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997).
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deconstruction of a claimed scientific status quo on the basis of evidence that
judges find inadequate. 112 The trilogy of evidence decisions aims, in principle, to
set high threshold standards of adequacy for new scientific evidence. Evidence
generated within the litigation context to serve a party’s interests can never claim
to be completely disinterested. In asking judges to scrutinize such claims with
special care, the Supreme Court arguably recognized and sought to redress the
problems of asymmetric standards and excessive transparency that have arisen in
rulemaking processes such as EPA’s evaluation of atrazine.
Daubert and its progeny serve as stopping rules against unwarranted
deconstruction. Evidence deemed insufficient is kept away from jury members,
who might not meet any of Collins and Evans’s three criteria of epistemic
competence.113 But then neither do most judges. The three evidence rulings
accordingly have introduced asymmetries and inconsistencies of their own into
legal disputes about the quality and reliability of science. They have done so
chiefly through an uncritical acceptance of the scientific method and by casting the
judiciary in the role of amateur sociologists of knowledge.114 In these decisions the
Court also turns a blind eye to what we may call the political economy of
knowledge production. Incentives for replicating and building on litigationgenerated research are, at present, asymmetrically distributed. Corporate
defendants have strong reasons, and resources, to sponsor studies that will
negate claims made by plaintiffs’ experts;115 comparable incentives do not
necessarily exist on the plaintiffs’ side, except to the extent that lawyers expect
to benefit from pursuing mass tort claims and may therefore support the
production of necessary expert evidence. And neither corporate interests nor
those of trial lawyers are likely, without additional safeguards, to lead to the
production of the highest-quality scientific knowledge.

112. In Daubert, the Supreme Court rejected general acceptance as the test for whether science is
good or not good. 509 U.S. at 589. The Court chose, instead, to adopt a more stringent rule, which
considers, among other things, whether the science “has been subjected to peer review.” Id. at 593.
After General Electric Co., parties seeking to introduce science also must establish that the conclusions
reached, as opposed to just the methods used, by science are relevant and established. 522 U.S. at 144,
147. The Supreme Court extended these stringent rules to technological testimony, as well, in Kumho
Tire Co. 526 U.S. at 148–52.
113. See discussion supra Part III.
114. Sheila Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
S49, S49–S50, S53 (2005). For additional critical perspectives on Daubert, see JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT
THE BAR, supra note 90, at 62–67 and John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1 (1996).
115. In the case of silicone gel breast implant litigation, for example, this defensive strategy led to
the production of considerable amounts of epidemiological data tending to disprove claims of immune
system disorders caused by the implants. Some commentators took this as evidence of the legal
system’s reliance on bad science, overlooking the law’s pivotal role in prompting study of the issue in
the first place. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996).
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V
CONCLUSION: A REASONED
TRANSPARENCY—OPENING BLACK BOXES IN SCIENCE AND LAW
Openness is a treasured attribute of science, but like most good things, even
scientific openness has to be purposefully cultivated and judiciously deployed in
order to serve its intended functions well. Taking Sissela Bok’s treatment of
secrecy as a point of departure, I have suggested that concealment, even when it
is intentional, is not itself a problem for science. It is necessary to distinguish
between good and bad concealment. For public science, that inquiry entails a
critical look at sequestration practices that conceal science, unintentionally or
otherwise, from particular audiences.
In practice, both scientific communities and other social institutions have
recognized the need for trade-offs between partial sequestration and complete
openness. Science is never wholly transparent to all eyes. Its instruments,
processes, and outputs are only selectively available for external review and
criticism—not necessarily to those audiences that could most effectively
criticize or rely on them. Some potentially effective critics are barred from
participation by lack of knowledge or access to information; others are too close
to the research to have the necessary critical detachment; still others are
excluded through organizational practices that produce concealment as an
unintended consequence. As the links between science and society have grown
more dense and as science has come to influence more decisions affecting the
collective well-being of democratic societies, the need has therefore grown to
reexamine the practices of sequestration and to adjust, if need be, the existing
compromises between openness and concealment.
That the quality of scientific claims is no longer the only issue of social
concern complicates that rebalancing. Supplementary questions about the
purposes of science (what is it good for?) and about its adequacy (is it good
enough?) have grown in significance over the past several decades. Those
normative judgments cannot be left exclusively in the hands of researchers
responsible for producing knowledge. Accordingly, standard practices of
review by technically informed peers have to be extended to include other
interested and informed critics. In the case of public, or policy-relevant,
science, the question, “How transparent should science be?” thus entails an
automatic corollary: To whom should it be transparent? Experience suggests
that this question can be answered fruitfully only if we recognize and take note
of some common pathologies of science-based decisionmaking. Three common
pathologies were identified above as worthy of special attention, namely, the
problems of imperfect accountability, asymmetric standards, and excessive
transparency.
All three affect the production of reliable scientific knowledge, but all
reflect at bottom procedural deficiencies: withholding access from, or in some
cases granting it to, the wrong people, at the wrong times, for the wrong
purposes. The law—with its traditional emphasis on procedural adequacy—
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should serve in principle as an important source of corrective principles and
policies. Those principles may have to be reflexively applied within the law
itself. Even though the law has become an important site for the production of
public science, it operates with its own institutional interests and practices that
may at times stand in the way of optimal openness.
If opening up science to the world at large is neither feasible nor likely to
produce more reliable results, how can citizens be assured that their interests
will be fairly represented in the evaluation of public science?
U.S.
administrative law offers two solutions, which, if consistently implemented,
might make for significant improvements and might also prevent blatant
episodes of illegitimate concealment. The first is to leave it to citizens
themselves to answer the question, “Open to whom?” In effect, legal
provisions that permit interested and affected parties to question the basis of
agency decisions do just that, although in practice it may take exceptional
resources or motivation to make use of the rights so granted. The second
approach is to ensure, as far as possible, that public science is evaluated by
bodies representing an adequate range of competence and interests, as the
Federal Advisory Committee Act seeks to do. To include an appropriate
breadth of perspectives, it may be necessary to accommodate both lay and
professional viewpoints, as is currently done in many ethics advisory
committees.116 The normative questions that arise in the assessment of policyrelevant science may demand a similar expansion in the membership of
important technical advisory committees as well.
Notions of fairness and balance, systematically applied, could go some
distance toward correcting the problem of asymmetric standards. Courts,
agencies, and other governmental decisionmakers are frequently in a position
to note, and remedy, the application of discrepant standards to science
emerging from different sources. There are a number of recurrent sources of
asymmetry in disputes involving public science. For example, is privately
generated science subject to the same requirements of disclosure and peer
review as science sponsored with public funds? Are different disclosure
standards being applied in different institutional contexts or (as in the recent
controversies over pharmaceutical drug trials) applied to negative as opposed to
positive study results? Are inappropriately high thresholds being set for those
who produce novel evidence or develop new methods, especially in work that
reveals previously unrecognized risks and threats?
Finally, well-crafted stopping rules, such as the law’s very general rule of
stare decisis117 or rules of judicial deference to expert agency judgments,118 can
116. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (N.J. 1976) (noting that most hospital ethics committees are
comprised of members who are not doctors).
117. The doctrine of stare decisis requires courts “to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same
points arise again in litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
118. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that an
agency’s permissible construction of the statute it administers is entitled to deference if Congress has
not directly spoken to the precise question at issue); Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def.

02__JASONOFF.DOC

44

10/4/2006 9:01 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:21

provide some protection against excessive transparency. In determining when
to end further debate, thereby black-boxing the scientific status quo, judges and
policymakers should, however, ask focused questions about the adequacy of the
debate that has already taken place. Generally, the argument for continued
debate or additional review is weakest where delegation and fairness concerns
are explicitly addressed and where there are no pressing questions about the
epistemic competence of researchers or reviewers.
Correspondingly, a
demonstration that these basic attributes of rational decisionmaking were
neglected offers strong grounds for opening up contested scientific matters to
wider scrutiny.
The transparency of science generated for the purpose of litigation raises
additional issues for law and policy. Here, the question is not only about how
to ensure the quality and reliability of expert evidence—the concerns addressed
in the Supreme Court’s three evidence rulings—but also, when appropriate,
about how to ensure its evenhanded production and wider dissemination for the
benefit of science and society. The law’s focus on individual cases and its
commitment to closure create substantial disincentives to the free flow of
knowledge, and it will take thoughtful institutional innovations to lower those
barriers without compromising the interests of justice. Settlement practices, in
particular, need to be reexamined to make sure that expediency in the
particular case does not override society’s need for accumulating knowledge.
Made suitably anonymous, registers of studies conducted pursuant to products
liability or environmental damage lawsuits could serve a data-gathering
function similar to NIH’s register of negative clinical trials of pharmaceutical
drugs. Once we recognize, moreover, that litigation is an indispensable aid to
knowledge production, procedures aimed at increased transparency, such as
enforced negotiation between parties and some forms of external review, could
be devised to improve the quality and reliability of the science that lawsuits
help generate.
It is perhaps appropriate to end these reflections on the openness of public
science with a final comment on Daubert, celebrated for more than a decade as
returning the control of science in the legal process to scientists—mediated, to
be sure, by judges who are trusted to apply science’s own standards to the
admissibility of evidence. Besides its much-discussed conceptual weaknesses,
the Daubert trilogy shuts off the kind of normative inquiry that should be
central to the evaluation of public science. It is not enough for judges looking
at evidence generated within the legal process to ask only the question that
scientists have classically asked of each other’s work: “Is it good science?”
Judges, as society’s delegates, should also ask the normative questions that must
be raised in evaluations of public science: Is the science good for the purposes
we need it for, and is it good enough for those purposes? In allowing those
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (holding that the court’s only task on review is to determine whether
the agency has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts it
found and the choice it made).
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issues to resurface within the purview of admissibility hearings, sophisticated
post-Daubert judges may conclude that they should think not only like
scientists, but also like concerned and committed citizens—arguably, in short,
like jurors.

